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Abstract
The article examines the complexity of Tunisian Salafism in the context of the Tunisian 
transition to democracy. Building on primary sources and original field work, the article 
highlights the theoretical and practical divergences that affect the Salafist camp in Tunisia 
in its struggle to continue a revolutionary project for a sector of disenfranchised youth 
unwilling to support a process of renewal of political institutions that they perceive as con-
tributing their marginalization. In addition, the article explores the ways in which, para-
doxically, the emergence and public presence of Salafism can contribute to the strengthening 
of democratic debate in the country.
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Introduction
The English-speaking academic literature on Arab politics and society 
of the last three decades tended to neglect the case of Tunisia. Despite 
some notable exceptions, including John Entelis, Stephen King, Eva Bellin, 
*) The authors are thankful to the two anonymous referees for their comments, which con-
siderably imrpoved the article. The authors are grateful to the Gerda Henkel Foundation for 
funding this research in the context of the programme ‘From over-estimation to under- 
estimation: the trajectory of political Islam in five MENA countries.’
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Laryssa Chomiak, Christopher Alexander, Emma Murphy, and Melani 
Cammett, Tunisia never featured prominently either as a single case study 
or in comparative works. The fall of the Ben Ali regime seemed to change 
that and both the policy-making community and academia focused exten-
sively on Tunisia. The country offers a significant opportunity to under-
stand and explain the causes of the Arab Spring, gauge the possibility of a 
transition to democracy in an Arab country, highlight the challenges that 
regime changes entail and examine their implications for regional politics 
and international security. However, and true to form, the attention on 
Tunisia faded quite quickly, particularly after the successful October 2011 
elections for the Constituent Assembly, as more ‘relevant’ countries became 
embroiled in the ‘Spring’ with Egypt and Syria in particular taking centre 
stage.
For the majority of scholars and analysts still following Tunisia, the insti-
tutional changes and the daily political developments characterizing the 
transition have become the exclusive focus. We thus have analyses of the 
‘success’ of the Tunisian transition1 together with more sober ones high-
lighting the problems the country faces as it builds a liberal-democratic 
system.2 All this is certainly important and to a certain extent justified by 
the fact that the first phase of the transition, roughly from January 2011 until 
October of the same year, saw the rapid institutionalization and the return 
to open activism of the traditional political families of the country: the lib-
eral left incarnated by Moncef Marzouki, Najib Chebbi and Mohammad 
Ben Jaafar, the Islamists led by Rachid Ghannouchi and the extreme left 
with the communists at the forefront. In addition, there has been the 
re-appropriation of autonomy on the part of the historic trade union, 
the UGTT. The elections of October 2011 saw the victory of the Islamist 
Ennahda, which formed a government coalition with the liberal left in 
order to guarantee a smooth transition to democracy by overseeing the 
drafting of a new Constitution. Since then, most analyses have focused on 
how the government performed, on the internal problems the coalition 
has, on its supposed incompetence, on Ennahda’s perceived ‘double- 
speak’ when it comes to its commitment to democracy and secularism and 
1) Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s transition and the twin tolerations,” Journal of Democracy 23 
(2012): 89-103.
2) Paul Aarts, Pieter van Dijke, Iris Kolman, Jort Statema and Ghassan Damman, From 
Resilience to Revolt. Making sense of the Arab Spring (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 
2012): 1-109.
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on the return on the scene of those politicians who are still inspired 
by Bourguibism together with the usual debate on women’s rights.3 The 
assassination of the left-wing political leader Chokri Belaid in February 
2013 crystallized many of these debates with numerous analyses examining 
its impact on the nascent institutions. This almost exclusive focus on 
institutional politics and on how the new political system deals with the 
social and economic challenges produces however an analytical vacuum 
with respect to what is occurring in wider society. This shortcoming repro-
duces to a large extent the analytical mistakes that were made before 
the Arab Spring occurred when the attention on the state and on high poli-
tics generally clouded the way in which society was reacting to the upgrad-
ing of authoritarian rule.4 In the Tunisian case, important aspects of the 
transition have only been marginally examined, preventing therefore a 
clearer understanding of the emergence of phenomena that are labeled 
‘surprising’ when in fact they might not actually be so. For instance, very 
little has been made of the low turnout for the October 2011 elections when 
over 45 per cent of citizens could not be bothered turning out for what 
were considered ‘historic’ elections. Such low turnout should lead to ask 
questions about the political and social attitudes of those who did not 
vote and about the type of socio-political movements that they might feel 
represented by. It should also lead to questions about the way in which 
they might engage socially, if at all, and what the consequences for the 
transition this might have. The advanced age of the leadership across 
the political spectrum is a second element that should lead to questions 
about the role of the younger generation, the one that was at the forefront 
of the Jasmine Revolution. Where has the youth gone? What kind of social 
and political activism, if any, draws young Tunisians today in the midst 
of a process of reconstruction of society and its institutions? A final 
important element is the middle-class nature of the current process of 
political democratic institutionalization whereby the poorer strata of 
the population are barely involved in the construction of the new state. 
3) On Ennahda and the transition see Sarah Feuer, “Islam and Democracy in Practice: 
Tunisia’s Ennahda Nine Months In,” Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 
Brandeis University 66 (2012): 1-8. On the challenges facing the Tunisian economy see Nader 
Habibi, “The Economic Agendas and Expected Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia,” 
Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University 67 (2012): 1-8.
4) Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, “The end of authoritarian rule and 
the mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali,” Mediterranean Politics 17 (2012): 179-195.
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Those who are economically marginalized and more generally disenfran-
chised do not feature much and their demands are dismissed in the name 
of economic realism with such dismissal coming from the vast majority 
of political actors, including Ennahda. However these socio-economic 
and political instances have to eventually find a home, particularly because 
there is a high degree of pluralism today in the country which permits 
all sorts of political and social movements to organize and be active. 
This does not mean that poverty leads inevitably to political radicaliza-
tion, but it provides a fertile terrain for a religious activism that does not 
promise the attainment of material wealth, but offers a righteous path 
to life that becomes attractive when there is little else to strive for in 
expectation.
The rise of Salafism in the aftermath of the transition does not answer 
these questions directly, but provides an example of the many complex and 
unexpected social phenomena that ‘explode’ on the public scene when the 
previous political order disappears.
With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the emergence of Salafism 
came as a shock to many Tunisians and to the international community 
and that a significant degree of political and mediatic alarmism has charac-
terized the few analyses of the phenomenon.5 Such analyses are usually 
linked to the threat that Salafism poses to the consolidation of the demo-
cratic process, but very little is actually known about the way in which the 
Salafist ideology is differently interpreted and used in the areas of the 
country where it is taking hold. Belaid’s assassination has not only height-
ened domestic tensions between seculars and Islamists, but brought once 
again Salafism to the fore in so far as mediatic analyses tend to focus on it 
to explain why the Tunisian revolution is being somehow betrayed.6 
Through an examination of the less discussed aspects of the Tunisian tran-
sition, this article attempts to account for the emergence of Salafism and 
its arrival on the public scene, providing a picture of the differences 
that exist within it and highlighting new social and political practices that 
characterize it.
5) See for instance Anne Wolff and Raphael Levefre, “The demon or the demonized? 
Deconstructing ‘salafism’ in Tunisia,” Open Democracy, June 5, 2012.
6) See for instance Peter Beaumont and Patrick Kingsley, “Violent tide of Salafism threatens 
the Arab Spring”, The Observer, February 10 2013. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2013/feb/09/violent-salafists-threaten-arab-spring-democracies
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The Rise of Salafism
One of the most interesting and surprising outcomes of the Arab Spring 
has been the forceful public emergence of Salafist movements across 
the region. In its modern meaning Salafism refers to “conservative Sunni 
Muslims who seek to apply literalist interpretations of scripture based on 
the example set by the Prophet and his companions.”7 Salafist movements 
have been traditionally divided into two broad categories: scientific or 
scripturalist Salafists engaged in the promotion of individual behavioral 
change through dawa and jihadi Salafists engaged in violence to bring 
about an Islamic state where sharia would be imposed. Such categorization 
remains only partially valid today as Salafist movements across the region 
are displaying quite different modes of activism.
In Egypt, the vast majority of Salafists groups decided early on that they 
would take advantage of the electoral process to form a political coalition 
that did extremely well in the legislative elections,8 contravening in many 
ways one of the central tenets of scripturalist Salafism which forbids the 
creation of associations or parties. In Mali, Salafist groups benefited from 
the retreat of the central government in the northern regions of the coun-
try to strike an alliance with local separatist groups and create some sort of 
emirate governed through the imposition of strict sharia law. In doing so, 
these Salafists have imposed harsh social norms through violence. In Syria, 
Salafist armed groups are very active in the civil war against the govern-
ment and are attracting an increasing number of foreign fighters.9 In 
Morocco, the vast majority of Salafists are still committed to political and 
social change through dawa and educational activities, although some of 
them are attempting to set up a political party.10 All this indicates, as Meijer 
had already suggested, that Salafism as a whole is a very complex phenom-
enon where different interpretations of the sacred texts give rise to differ-
ent methods of political and social engagement.11 In addition, the specific 
  7) International Crisis Group, “Tentative Jihad: Syrian Fundamentalist Opposition,” Middle 
East Report 131 (2012): 5.
  8) Stephane Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism,” Brookings 
Institute, Policy Briefing June (2012): 1-12.
  9) Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security 
Report 6 (2012): 1-42.
10) Sanaa Karim, “Party Politics for Morocco Salafis,” Sada, October 2, 2012.
 11) Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism. Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2009): 1-463.
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characteristics of very diverse national contexts create further opportuni-
ties and constraints for Salafist movements.
The case of Tunisia is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. 
First of all, Salafism never seemed to have a presence in the country. A sig-
nificant number of Tunisians still contend that its emergence following the 
revolution is due to outside influences and that democratization has con-
tributed to its creation, allowing foreign ideas and practices to reach the 
country very easily. As demonstrated elsewhere, this is not really the case 
and although important Salafist figures in Tunisia have ‘cut their teeth’ 
abroad, the movement as a whole finds its roots in the rise of Islamism of 
the late 1980s and the protagonists of today are mainly a young generation 
of disenfranchised youth product of the later years of the Ben Ali dictator-
ship.12 Second, Salafist groups in Tunisia have the opportunity to operate in 
a very free, liberalized and plural political and social environment which, 
for the moment, does not really have any equal across the region. This 
opportunity further polarizes the debate within the Salafist movement 
about the best course of action to achieve its goals. Third, these groups have 
to contend with the fact that an Islamist party is in power. This means that 
while they are, to a degree, in conflict and competition with it, at the same 
time they have to recognize that they are not dealing with what they could 
label easily an ‘impious’ regime.13 Salafists are also aware that Ennahda 
could constitute a precious ally in the increasingly polarized struggle 
between Islamists and seculars that characterizes Tunisian politics. These 
specificities make the Tunisian case an exceptional one and can provide 
interesting and useful insights as to how Salafism operates and evolves.
While there is a tendency, particularly in the media, to treat the phenom-
enon of the rise of Salafism as a coherent and cohesive program of conser-
vative revolutionary change usually associated with acts of violence and 
prevarication, this study demonstrates the heterogeneity of Tunisian 
Salafism and sheds some light on its inner workings and complexity in a 
situation of almost permanent flux, confirming earlier findings in the liter-
ature on Salafism.
12) Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “The emergence of Salafism in Tunisia,” Jadaliyya 
August 18 (2012). Available at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence- 
of-salafism-in-tunisia
13) There has been in this sense an intense debate within the Salafist movement as to the 
degree and type of support that should be given to Ennahda with important figures arguing 
for an alliance of convenience with it to counter the secular camp.
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The first political actor that deserves to be analyzed when it comes to the 
Salafist movement is Jebah al-Islah (Reform Front). There are today other 
Salafist parties on the scene such as Asala, led by Ali Mouladi Jihadi, and 
Arrahma, led by Said Jaziri, but the Reform Front is more interesting in so 
far as its leaders can claim to have been the first modern Salafists active in 
Tunisia since the early 1980s. The creation of the Reform Front and its 
choice of participation in the current institutions of the state mark it out as 
exceptional because of the implicit acceptance of the democratic rules of 
the game despite sharia not being the legal framework for these democratic 
procedures and mechanisms. Its legalization in March 2012 indicates that 
there is a Salafist constituency interested in breaking with what can be 
called ‘street politics’ in order to institutionalize its political demands no 
matter how unappealing and radically conservative they might appear to 
the rest of society. As the party also makes clear, their primary objective is 
to ‘catch’ the Salafist support that is clearly present in wider society and 
turn it into electoral and political capital to be used to attain the most sig-
nificant political goal the party has: the application of sharia law in Tunisia. 
As the party leader Mohammed Khouja told the authors in an interview 
held on October 24, 2012 at the party’s headquarters in Tunis, ‘our ambition 
is to unify the Salafist front.’ Another leading member of the bureau execu-
tive of Jebah al-Islah, Rafik Aouni interviewed by the authors on October 22, 
2012 in Tunis, spoke for instance of the contacts and exchanges they have 
with the Egyptian Nour regarding their political experience as political par-
ties involved in the institutions of the state.
In reality, this perceived institutionalization of Salafism is nothing novel 
for the members and leaders of this party in so far as it represents the con-
tinuation of what they had already done in the 1980s when they broke from 
the Mouvement Tendence Islamique (MTI) – Ennahda’s precursor – to form 
the Tunisian Islamic Front. Thus, in many ways, the dilemma of whether 
Salafists should create a political party even in apparent contradiction with 
the ideological tenets of orthodox Salafism had been solved three decades 
ago for this older generation of Salafists because the theoretical and ideo-
logical debate over direct participation in politics through a party did not 
really exist at the time. As Mohammed Khouja argued ‘at the time [1970s 
and 1980s], the choice between dawa or politics was not much part of the 
theoretical debate on how Muslims should be involved in the betterment of 
their society in the sense that it was for us obviously a matter of doing both 
although we had differences regarding the degree to which the group 
should privilege one or the other.’ Thus, in the case of Jebah al-Islah and the 
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other legal Salafist parties, we can talk about re-institutionalization because 
forming a political party was for this generation not particularly controver-
sial. This is further demonstrated when one looks at the relationship of the 
Jebah al-Islah with Ennahda. The major divergence between the two parties 
does not evolve on the choice of doing politics and not even on the plural-
ism that the political system should display, but has to do with the vision of 
society that the two movements have. Contrary to Ennahda, Jebah al-Islah 
is thoroughly committed to the application of sharia law as a foundational 
source of legislation with fundamentalist and orthodox canons proper of 
Salafism. It is very difficult to gauge exactly the popular support of Jebah 
al-Islah in a country in transition and where there is a considerable degree 
of volatility, but according to a poll published in September 2012 the party 
does not figure as having any real electoral support. This is due to the fact 
that Jebah al-Islah is a party for Salafists of a much older generation despite 
having, according to the leaders, the important support of leading Salafist 
sheikhs such as Kamel Marzouki, Bachir Ben Hassen, Hassin Shaouat and 
Hatem Bou Soma.14 These figures however prefer to remain involved in 
education activities and more broadly in civil society activism rather than 
becoming political public figures and openly endorse the party. In addition 
sheikhs like Bachir Ben Hassen are labeled ‘Salafi-lite’ and their activism 
does not seem to have much traction with radical jihadi circles. Irrespective 
of the genuine degree of support that such sheikhs might give the party, it 
is important to note that they do have however a common objective: the 
moderation of the young Salafist radicals imbued with jihadism – not nec-
essarily defined as armed struggle rather as internal striving – in order to 
de-radicalize society and, at the same time, indicate a political outlet in 
institutional politics. What is clear is that the legal parties and the Salafi-lite 
sheikhs attempt to counter the violent tendencies that exist within jihadi 
Salafism and that have led young Salafists to be involved in numerous inci-
dents such as the attacks on the US embassy, the destruction of holy sites 
associated with the ‘wrong’ practice of Islam and rioting with the police.
In any case, it is young Salafist radicals, whether violent or not, that bet-
ter represent the emergence of Salafism in Tunisia and it is this cohort that 
is one of the most significant political and social protagonists emerging 
from Tunisian transition. Broadly speaking, it largely rejects institutional 
14) These four sheikhs founded the private university ‘Imam Malek of Sharia Sciences’ in the 
autumn of 2012 located in Tunis.
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politics because it does not believe that politics within plural institutions 
can deliver the ethical goods they crave. As Meijer argues, ‘because its 
emphasis is on doctrinal purity and not politics, Salafism ... has been able to 
empower individuals by providing a universal model of truth and social 
actions.’ Thus, individual empowerment becomes central to the detriment 
of institutional political engagement. The sociological composition of 
these Salafist radicals is largely that of the mouhammishin – the disenfran-
chised – of Tunisian society. This term is quite useful to understand the 
phenomenon of this radicalism in so far as it is used in a derogatory sense 
in those political and social circles that are participating to the construc-
tion of new institutions. The sense that the liberal- democratic order being 
built in Tunisia is the work of two different social blocs (a conservative reli-
gious bourgeoisie and a nationalist modernizing one), which excludes a 
priori the more radical political demands of the poorer classes of society, 
permeates the activism of the Salafists. The usefulness of the terminology 
of the muhammishin is also that they were the protagonists of the revolu-
tionary uprising and met the violence of the security forces with violence 
of their own reinforcing through their actions the  revolutionary drive of the 
rest of society, as indicated in Amin Allal’s work as well.15 These young men, 
as they are overwhelmingly men, are generally poorly educated, come from 
lower classes and they have very rarely opportunities to enter the job mar-
ket because they lack the necessary skills to compete. In fact, they repre-
sent the dark side of the development model that Ben Ali offered. They are 
the ones who attempted to leave the country in order to reach the northern 
bank of the Mediterranean illegally – incidentally it is something that con-
tinues to this day – and often displayed a considerable degree of social vio-
lence in very specific and confined contexts such as football stadiums.16 
This cohort has been left out not only from the material benefits of the 
‘Tunisian economic miracle’, but also from the cultural and social practices 
associated to the modernizing efforts and reforms of the previous regimes 
whereby any regime-led discussion of modernity and secularism was not 
even contemplated and reflected upon. It simply did not reach this sector 
of society in any meaningful way. On the contrary, their values of references 
15) Amin Allal, “Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier,” Politique Africaine, 
121 (2011) : 53-67.
16) Laryssa Chomiak and John Entelis, “Contesting Order in Tunisia. Crafting political iden-
tity,” in Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule, ed. Francesco Cavatorta (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 73-93.
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as well as the symbols they use is rife with forms of simplistic religious rep-
resentation, which is an edgier  re-elaboration of what they are daily 
exposed to in their family environment and in their immediate neighbor-
hood, the real extent of their socialization outside the home. Obviously, the 
social composition of the Salafist movement is not restricted to the disen-
franchised because there is also the important presence of ‘learned’ older 
sheikhs who have a different background. In addition the movement has an 
interest in being portrayed and projecting an image of defending the cause 
of the downtrodden. However, embracing Salafism is about building a new 
individual and collective religious identity that is attractive to many young 
disenfranchised people because it provides not only a clear framework 
within which they understand their condition, but, more importantly, 
allows them to improve their social standing in so far as they are now part, 
as Salafists, of the selected few to whom the truth has been revealed. When 
the dictatorship falls and new spaces of post-revolutionary identification 
are permitted to exist out in the open in a rapid liberalizing and pluralizing 
society, many of them quite spontaneously embrace the more radical form 
of Salafism with jihadi inclinations because this allows them to express 
their radicalism through the permissible language of religion. This type of 
Salafism, which, once again, needs not to embrace armed violence because 
it can be also practiced as militant individual engagement to be a better 
Muslim and strive to convince others of the ‘right path’, also provides a 
political dimension that allows the mouhammishin to question the way in 
which the new Tunisian political authority is being constructed because, 
just as the previous one, it marginalizes them and becomes therefore 
unjust. It should be anticipated at this stage that the demands of the Salafist 
movement are however not linked to specific economic grievances in any 
class-based sense and therefore we cannot refer to the classic concept of 
class to frame it. Salafism is appealing to the disenfranchised not because of 
the potential material benefits that engagement with the movement might 
deliver once political power is obtained. Far from it, it is appealing because 
‘Salafism transforms the humiliated, the downtrodden, disgruntled young 
people, the discriminated migrant, or the politically repressed into a cho-
sen sect (al-firqa al-najiya) that immediately gains access to the Truth.’17  
It is this message and practice of what can be considered moral and 
17) Roel Meijer, “Introduction” in Global Salafism. Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel 
Mejer (London: Hurst and Company, 2009), 1-32.
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 intellectual superiority that empowers individuals, mobilizing them as a 
collective entity to convince others of the religious authenticity of the path 
they chose. As Monica Marks aptly put it, ‘for young Salafis, many of whom 
feel unrepresented by Ennahda, economically disenfranchised, and increas-
ingly shunted aside by the elitism of Tunisian party politics, the promise 
and purity of Islam remain immensely inspirational.’18 In addition to this, 
the return to the perceived purity of the original religious message and 
practice of Islam offers two significant instruments. First, it allows them to 
find points of reference that explain their marginal socio-economic condi-
tion and a map to get out of it in a world they cannot otherwise make sense 
of due to the clash between Western modernity and tradition they find 
themselves trapped in their own society. Embracing the authentic message 
of the sacred text is the only way out of marginality. Second, it provides 
them with a tool to criticize their elders who are accused of subscribing to 
a religiosity that is both repetitive and unfulfilling and therefore unable to 
capture and understand the universal significance of Islam and of the 
prophet’s mission. After all their ‘fathers’ had willingly or unwillingly 
accepted the corrupt, authoritarian and impious government of Ben Ali 
while they succeeded in overthrowing it. As Haykel highlights in his study 
on Salafism, ‘it is striking how relatively easy it is to become an authority 
figure among the Salafis’,19 which allows young people to therefore chal-
lenge older and more learned scholars and figures if they do not embrace 
the authenticity of the religious message. This aspect of Salafism is quite 
helpful to those young people that are still in a revolutionary frame of mind 
where traditional relationships can and should be subverted. The absence 
of respect within Salafist circles for prominent figures of Tunisian Islamism 
such as Abdelfattah Mourou is a testimony to that. In part therefore, the 
absence of appeal for the message of Jebah al-Islah can be thus linked to 
this generational fracture and suggests that there are other political actors 
within salafism more capable of conveying the instances of the mouham-
mishin. Leading Salafists have no qualms admitting that they belong to 
and they seek the support of this social category of disenfranchised; in fact 
they find pride in it. Whereas other political forces including Ennahda and 
18) Monica Marks, “Who are Tunisia’s Salafis?”, Foreign Policy, The Middle East Channel, 
September 28, 2012. Available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/28/who 
_are_tunisia_s_salafis?wp_login_redirect = 0
19) Bernard Haykel, “On the nature of Salafi thought and action” in Global Salafism. Islam’s 
New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Mejer (London: Hurst and Company, 2009), 33-57.
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 sectors of scientific Salafism use the representation of such a social cate-
gory to discredit them, the jihadi Salafists in particular consider this class as 
the vehicle for a process of genuine indigenous Islamic re-generation in 
Tunisia and the point of departure of their mission of dawa. The dawa offi-
cer of the Salafist movement Ansar a-Sharia, Hassan Briek, jailed for his 
perceived role in the attack on the US embassy in September 2012 and 
released in January 2013, reveals with pride in an interview with the authors 
held on September 22 2012 in Yasminette, that many of the young people 
now active in the movement were recruited in jail during the Ben Ali era 
when they were serving sentences for non-political crimes. This highlights 
the connection between the marginalized youth falling into a life of crime 
and their subsequent ‘conversion’ to Salafism through dawa in prison. This 
is a point of pride for the movement rather than shame because it demon-
strates the power of the religious message in redeeming lives. In addition, 
the same Hassan Briek talks about the large following that the movement 
has in difficult – read poorer – areas and neighborhoods such as Ettadhamen, 
al-Omrana al-ala, al-Khadra and Ibn Khaldoun in Tunis, Menzel Bourghiba 
and Sejenene in the province of Bizerte and Sidi Bouzid. Briek is happy to 
claim the success of the process of politicization of a social group that 
encountered and still encounters considerable discrimination and con-
tempt from the rest of society. It is very difficult to establish with any cer-
tainty the number of activists and supporters that come from a 
disenfranchised background because of the embryonic organizational 
structures the movement has (Salafist activities usually take place at the 
local mosque level) and because of the reluctance to divulge what might be 
seen as sensitive information. In any case, field observation indicates that 
most of the Salafist activism occurs in what might be labeled problematic 
poorer areas in urban centers. The politicization of the mouhammishin into 
Salafism exposes some of the difficulties of a transition to democracy that 
seems to concern only higher social classes, busy finding an institutional 
democratic compromise that is not perceived to be able to radically change 
social relations in Tunisia because it is fundamentally a bourgeois pact 
within which, inevitably, some form of unbelief, according to Salafists, will 
be enshrined in so far as the secular sector of society has to be accommo-
dated. Largely confirming the fracture and absence of communication 
within Tunisian society is the fact that while the Constitutional Assembly 
keeps working on the new text and the traditional politicians are busy 
 arguing, very few notice the growth of the Salafist phenomenon and even 
fewer analyze it and understand it, limiting themselves to condemn the 
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most  visible and violent demonstrations of its presence. The relevant role 
of the concept of class might seem outdated, but it is helpful in framing the 
way in which political struggles occur in the Arab world more generally,20 
but in Tunisia in particular because it allows a better understanding both 
the phenomenon of Salafism itself and the fear it instills in the other sec-
tors of society, although the Salafist movement does not frame its activism 
in terms of class and its ranks are the lumpenproletariat.21
The identification of the social group that radical Salafism largely draws 
from should not however lead to the assumption that there is a unified 
structured movement that is capable of monopolizing its representation 
nor that the demands of such movement build on economic grievances. 
Thus, a movement like Ansar a-Sharia, despite its importance and its 
undoubted primacy, should not be conflated with the whole spectrum of 
radical jihadi Salafism, which can be better defined as a movement or ten-
dency with unitary ideological pillars, religious and social references and 
political goals without yet a unified organisational structure that can speak 
for the whole camp.
A Movement in Search of an Organisation?
The overwhelming focus of Tunisian politicians, the media and the interna-
tional community on Salafists involved in violent demonstrations or in dis-
ruptive behavior usually leads to calls from the secular sector of society and 
many within Ennahda for a crackdown on Salafist activism.For repression 
to work however, it presupposes that there is a tightly organized structured 
movement within Salafism that can be easily targeted. This is not yet the 
case and this focus on the violence that Salafists at times display on the 
public scene should not obscure the fact that there is a daily practice of 
Salafism where there is no violence and, in addition, where differences over 
the direction of the movement forcefully emerge in line with the traditional 
divisions that plagued Salafism since its inception.
20) See for instance for the Egyptian case Hazem Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian Middle 
Class March to Tahrir Square?,” Mediterranean Politics 17 (2012): 197-215.
21) We are grateful to Yahia Zoubir for bringing this point to our attention and for suggesting 
a parallel with the failed Algerian transition in the early 1990s and the role of the Algerian 
lumpenproletariat in swelling the ranks of the Front Islamique du Salut.
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The daily practices and social activism of Salafism can be seen at work in 
the areas and neighborhoods mentioned earlier as a form of socialization 
that involves a youth that does not feel represented by the political system 
and prefers the clarity of the Salafist message because it allows them to take 
control of their lives and still live in a revolutionary climate because through 
the authenticity of the message they espouse they are building a new soci-
ety from the bottom-up. It is in these very specific contexts, and following 
the radicalization that both precedes and follows the revolution, that we 
see the emergence of a phenomenon that can be defined as ‘sheikh-ism.’ 
This is the arrival on the scene of a number of young sheikhs whose youth 
shocks and amazes society at large where an older generation, from politics 
to business to religious scholarship usually dominates. As mentioned ear-
lier, the revolutionary nature of Salafism is not necessarily about subverting 
a specific political order because of the ‘quietist’ tendencies that exist 
within the movement at large. Its revolutionary nature is that it provides 
clear doctrinal instruments that allow young people to be empowered and 
feel morally superior allowing them to subvert generational hierarchies. 
These young sheikhs found Salafism in two different manners. First, radi-
calization and religious awareness occurred in Ben Ali’s prisons during the 
period 2005-2011. Second, they became Salafist in the immediate aftermath 
of the revolution through a very rapid process of politicization forged in the 
clashes with the security forces and legitimized by the participation of the 
mouhammishin for the first time as social subjects in the success of the 
uprising. These young sheikhs become the transmission belts of knowledge 
and activism between the better known older Salafist sheikhs, who excel in 
the religious sciences or have acquired legitimacy because of their personal 
participation in international jihadi activities such as the war in Iraq, and 
the ordinary activists in their neighborhood of reference over which they 
exercise a degree of influence. What we have is not though an organized 
network that is structured around a formalized hierarchy, yet, but a looser 
type of an ever extending network based on personal informal contacts 
that is favored by the ‘preaching tours’ that the better known sheikhs under-
take throughout the country to lecture at different mosques. Some of these 
sheikhs do not simply lecture, but also offer longer courses on a specific 
topic or author and award students a form of accreditation of knowledge 
on religious matters. These lecturing tours go hand in hand with the cre-
ation of religious schools across the country. Non-governmental associa-
tions set up these schools and are in some ways the continuation of a 
phenomenon that had appeared in the late Ben Ali period when a number 
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of Quranic schools were opened in order to promote the correct reading 
of the Quran with the proviso that they refrain from engaging in political 
issues.22
All these activities contribute almost inevitably to a process of structura-
tion of the Salafist movement, but at the same time expose the significant 
differences that exist within it regarding the desirability and the extent of 
such structuration as well as divergences about leadership. Thus, with the 
expansion of the education dawa through the lectures and speaking tours 
and the sharing of symbolism and ideological convergence, there is the 
spontaneous emergence of three loose hierarchical levels: the famous reli-
giously knowledgeable sheikhs who are the theoretical and ideological 
points of reference; the neighborhood sheikhs that function as the interme-
diaries connecting the leaders of the movement to the popular base and 
then what can be described tentatively as ordinary activists who remain 
the more volatile part of the movement and do not necessarily follow in 
any meaningful way the directives and instructions coming from above 
precisely because a traditional organizational structure with its rules and 
procedures is still non-existent. In addition, the generational differences 
come into play. Older sheikhs’ views are not necessarily accepted in their 
entirety and when they are perceived to be wishing to take over the whole 
jihadi movement or speak in its name, the younger generation fails to 
accept it. After the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis in September 2012 a 
number of jihadi sheikhs appealed for calm and encouraged young activ-
ists to go back home and refrain from undertaking such acts in the future. 
Some of the older sheikhs had met President Marzouki and issues state-
ments appealing to calm after the meeting. A similar scenario occurred 
again during the rioting between Salafists and the police in Douar Hicher in 
October 2012. In response to this, according to a young sheikh, the internal 
debate intensified. In an interview with the authors on January 22, 2013 he 
stated ‘the youth of the movement was against it [the meeting at the presi-
dential palace]. It was a mistake, and we have no qualms to say it before our 
sheikhs. If the state wants to open a dialogue it has to come to us and not 
the opposite.’ This inter-generational mistrust even with the movement 
compounds the two most significant issues for the Salafist movement: how 
to deal with an embryonic structure that is still quite loose and whether it 
is desirable to strengthen it.
22) Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, “Beyond Ghannouchi. Islamism and 
Social Change in Tunisia,” Middle East Report 262 (2012): 20-25.
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It is at this juncture that the complexity of Tunisian Salafismis demon-
strated because we have the emergence of three camps that while agreeing 
on the fundamental ideological and doctrinal points of creating an Islamic 
state ruled by a strict interpretation of sharia law that would purge Tunisia 
of its Western-style modernity and of its religious reformism, are divided 
over the best way to achieve this goal. In addition, the movement and its 
ideological leaders in particular have to contend with two important 
aspects that affect their thinking. First there is the realization that the 
Salafist movement is growing quite rapidly and to a large extent indepen-
dently from clear organizational structures, as more and more young indi-
viduals make the choice of personal religious rediscovery according to 
Salafist canons. Second, there is also the ‘fear’ that too many un-controlled 
acts of violence on the part of what the rest of society sees as Salafist youth 
is damaging the image of Salafism as whole, equating it with violence and 
inviting repression. All of this leads to the opening up of an intense debate 
over structure and organization. To begin with there are two rather clear 
camps: the one favorable to the creation of clear and formal structures and 
the one resolutely opposed to it for both ideological/doctrinal and strategic 
reasons. A third camp might also slowly be emerging that is attempting 
to reconcile the two positions. The first camp is well represented by Abu 
Ayadh, the architect and recognized leader of Ansar a-Sharia. The group 
was founded officially in May 2012 although it had been operating already 
for almost year by then. The opposite camp finds in the works and activities 
of sheik Khatib Idrissi its point of reference. Idrissi is considered the spiri-
tual father of modern radical Tunisian Salafism. The third emerging camp 
can be seen in the attitude of Abu Abdallah Attunsi, another important and 
respected sheikh representing the middle-ground. When asked about his 
personal position on this debate in an interview on October 8, 2012 in Sidi 
Bouzid with the authors he replied that he preferred to remain in the mid-
dle and operate for a synthesis of the two options.
The intensity of the debate over the creation of formal organizational 
structures is explained by the fact that the principle of creating an organi-
zation is intrinsically in conflict with the ‘spirit’ of Salafism. For instance, 
scientific Salafists abhor all references and connotations that can lead one 
to identify the activism of Salafists with specific organizations. This is 
because it is in contradiction with the absolute principle of tawhid (unity), 
which is the theoretical foundation of Salafist thinking. The subscription to 
this principle of unity is shared across all Salafist currents and is the ideo-
logical foundation for Salafist orthodoxy. In many ways it crucially opposes 
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the principle of hizbiyya, which the term hizb as political party is derived 
from, because it is linked to the concept of juz’ia – partiality – considered 
to be the first step towards the problematic divisions within the commu-
nity of believers and therefore the ultimate negation of the principle of 
unity. It is a form of shirk (associationism). All this would indicate that 
structuring Salafism in order for it to take part in a process where these divi-
sions within the umma are institutionalized should not occur because gen-
uine Salafists should simply work within society to make these divisions 
disappear, justifying therefore the rejectionist approach of the second 
camp. However in very specific cases, as Abu Kattada makes it clear in the 
official organ of Ansar a-Sharia al-Wa’ad,23 when for historical contingen-
cies the umma finds itself in a position of weakness because under threat 
for instance from secular modernity or impious imperialism, the necessity 
to save it allows for the organization of a cohesive and formal group that is 
charged with leading the umma to ‘safety.’
This notion of the vanguard, which is an implicit reference to the work of 
Sayyid Qutb, therefore appears to justify the position of those like Abu 
Ayadh who emphasizes the present necessity for a formal organization. The 
Tunisian Salafist movement, and Salafism more generally, therefore display 
a rather profound fracture between those who are influenced by Qutb’s 
thinking and by implication that of the Muslim Brothers – keen on political 
participation through formally organized groups- and those who can be 
labeled as ‘fundamentally Salafists’ anchored to the hyper-orthodox con-
cept of tawhid. In practice this debate is translated in everyday activities 
with tentative steps towards a form of organizational institutionalization 
such as the one that Ansar a-Sharia represents and a pulling-back effect on 
the part of those who, while sharing Ansar a-Sharia’s objectives and ideo-
logical commitment, are still not convinced that a jamaa is yet necessary. 
For instance there are many young people who utilize the symbols of Ansar 
a-Sharia and share the political project of the group, but, at the same time, 
come close to negating its very existence because the local sheikhs of refer-
ence do not share the theoretical approach of Abu Ayadh and are therefore 
reluctant to be seen condoning the creation of a formal structure. As the 
young Salafist B. in an interview with the authors on September 25, 2012 in 
Tunis affirms ‘we are all brothers, and every single one of us is responsible 
for himself ’ suggesting that there is no need to belong to any organization 
23) Abu Kattada, “Between two methodologies,” al-Wa’ad No. 3, August (2012): 18-19.
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in order to be the ‘good Muslim’ that society requires you to be. More impor-
tantly it is not necessary to be a card-carrying member of a Salafist group 
because it is your personal example that is transformative of society. This 
partly explains the reason why it is so difficult to give Salafism a recogniz-
able and recognized face that represents the whole movement.
The ‘US embassy crisis’ of September 2012 highlights well the problems 
arising from any attempt to clearly identify and categorize Tunisian 
Salafism. Faced with the extremely worrying and negative consequences of 
the attack on the US embassy, the ruling coalition, under pressure both 
domestically and internationally to crack down on Salafism, targeted the 
leadership of Ansar a-Sharia. This led to arrest and imprisonment of many 
of its leading members, but not Abu Ayadh who became a fugitive. The 
repression of Ansar a-Sharia however brings to light the complexity of 
Salafism discussed above because the crackdown does not stop the growth 
of the movement in so far as it is unable to come to terms with the fact that 
Ansar a-Sharia does not represent the entire spectrum of Salafism. There 
are three different ways in which this complexity emerges on the public 
scene. First, we have the criticism of Ansar a-Sharia and Abu Ayadh coming 
from within the movement itself, specifically from that sector that never 
agreed with his choice of formal structuration precisely because it would 
invite, rather needlessly, repression rendering therefore the educational 
dawa potentially more difficult. Second, members of Ansar a-Sharia such 
as Hassan Briek questioned the validity of the crackdown in its political 
and strategic premises. For him, implicitly, targeting Ansar a-Sharia for 
repression is a mistake because he sees the movement as a positive devel-
opment in so far as it strives to give a ‘proper’ formal coordination and 
structuration to what is a popular Salafism in a state of flux, avoiding 
therefore its fusion in society as an anti-systemic force difficult to pin down. 
For Briek, Ansar a-Sharia is actually rendering a service to the ongoing 
process of institutionalization. Third, the lack of efficacy of the repressive 
campaign against Ansar a-Sharia in halting Salafist activism made the 
ruling coalition realize that the true nature of it is found in the movement 
and not in a movement. Thus, the state authorities attempted to reach the 
sector of un-structured Salafism through a dialogue with the leading figure 
in the second camp, sheikh Khatib Idrissi. On October 11 2012 the President 
of the Republic met officially with representatives of the salafist movement 
(among them, Khamis al-Majri, Mohammad Manif, Abu Abdallah a-Tunisi) 
nominated by a council of sheikhs headed by Idrissi himself. Thus, 
paradoxically, the ones who were against the creation of organisational 
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structures that could institutionalise Salafism found themselves having to 
create a structure, in this case the council of sheikhs, in order to ‘negotiate’ 
with representatives of the state to de-limit the space of activism and the 
boundaries of the permissible on the public scene. This indicates that even 
in the second camp the necessity of having at the very least a coordinating 
instance – tansiq – is present. It is this realization that favors the emergence 
of the third camp, attempting to reconcile two approaches that are theo-
retically in conflict, but that have to find some sort of compromise because 
of the liberal and democratic reality within which Salafism itself is operat-
ing. This reality requires a degree of institutionalized representation for 
negotiating purposes.
Elements for Reflection
This examination of the emergence and complexity of Tunisian Salafism 
outside the alarmist framework through which the phenomenon is often 
presented and discussed in public debates both inside and outside the 
country offers the possibility to link it to wider theoretical issues that are of 
importance for the understanding of processes of regime change.
First, any analysis of Salafism in Tunisia cannot exclude the class element 
that characterizes it. While the category of social class of Marxist inspira-
tion might not be any longer appropriate to understand political phenom-
ena in established democracies and advanced states, this is not necessarily 
the case in developing societies going through profound economic and 
political changes. Salafism in Tunisia is linked to the political and social 
expression of a social group of largely disenfranchised youth that perceives, 
rightly or wrongly, the construction of a new political system as the renova-
tion of a mechanism that, while no longer authoritarian, still excludes them 
from the enjoyment of material and ethical benefits they feel entitled to 
for having played a crucial role in the defeat of the Ben Ali regime. While 
this social group lacks the political self-consciousness of being a class and 
does not necessarily display economic grievances, the bulk of the recruits 
and activists have a distinct sociological profile. A very significant part of 
Tunisian society did not participate in the historic 2011 elections because it 
did not see how a new political system would change their everyday 
 conditions and a sector of this ‘non-participative’ society identifies the 
 current political and social blocs in the Constitutional Assembly with a 
political conservativism destined to replicate the existing class structures 
 F. Merone and F. Cavatorta /   
 Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 1–23 19
0001980839.INDD   19 3/19/2013   6:15:58 PM
 F. Merone and F. Cavatorta /  
20 Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 1–23
and preventing the coming of a genuine Islamic state where these would 
disappear. This class discourse is obviously not thought out in Salafist cir-
cles, but it should be noted in so far as the left in Tunisia could also become 
the beneficiary of the disillusionment of the disenfranchised if it were to 
campaign seriously in poorer urban areas. Thus, the problem is not neces-
sarily about the redistribution of material goods, although this plays a role, 
but is more intensely about ethical demands that Salafists see anchored in 
religion and, more specifically, in the mythical application of sharia law 
that by itself would solve all problems. The refusal in particular of Ennahda 
to subscribe to the application of sharia in a fundamentalist manner is per-
ceived to be an insult to Islam itself and therefore Salafists are unwilling to 
become involved in the construction of a political system that leads to an 
unjust society. The marginalization of this social class from the wider pro-
cess of transition to democracy recalls an older debate about the way in 
which a democratic system can be built when it has to accommodate the 
socio-economic demands coming from the disenfranchised sectors of soci-
ety.24 In order to build a liberal-democratic system these demands should 
be postponed with the preference for the establishment of clear procedural 
rules to govern the country. While this might indeed generate better func-
tioning institutions, it impedes the allegiance to the new system of vast 
sectors of the population as their demands, so they are told, are going to be 
dealt only at a later stage when the new institutions have proven their 
strength and durability. This strategy carries risks in the longer term because 
meeting the socio-economic and ethical/moral demands of the disenfran-
chised might not occur in the future, leading to profound imbalances. 
Tunisia is not there yet, but the confrontation with the Salafist movement 
might be an indication of how different social blocs interpret and more 
importantly live in their everyday practices the success of the revolution. 
What is important to highlight is that not all the disenfranchised find in 
Salafism the answers they are looking for. On the one hand, there are small 
socialist/communist formations that attempt to mobilize it, although with 
little success. On the other, there is a degree of apathy towards anything 
that is even remotely linked to politics or strict religious behavior that 
impedes the ‘enjoyment’ of new found freedoms.
Second, the Salafist movement finds itself in a predicament with respect 
to the wider environment in which it operates. All Salafists are clearly 
24) Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1990).
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opposed to any form of democracy that is outside the bounds of sharia law. 
In this sense they approve of democratic mechanisms of representation as 
long as the legislative outcomes are not in contradiction with sharia. This is 
however not the case at the moment, in so far as both the draft Constitution 
and ordinary legislation do not codify sharia in any meaningful way and, in 
addition, it is possible for decisions that go against sharia to be adopted as 
public policy. All this is exemplified in the answer that Briek gave to the 
question of how Ansar a – Sharia thinks about democracy:
we do not believe in democracy, although this does not mean that we are against the 
idea of elections or consultations to elect the representatives of the community. The 
point is that until we live in a society where there are secular people or there are those 
who do not apply sharia law, we cannot conceive of the fact that in the name of major-
ity rule a contravention of divine norms could be permissible. Within the framework of 
sharia law there is no reason why the community could not choose [through elections] 
its own representatives.
However, there is a clear realization that the free plural environment that 
they theoretically reject allows them to operate with little restraint either 
institutionally, if they choose that option, or in wider society through edu-
cational dawa. Despite the different ideological and theoretical approaches 
to organizational matters that divide the movement, all agree that at the 
moment the situation is rather favorable in so far as the degree of auton-
omy they enjoy is sufficiently strong to allow them to grow. It also means 
that in order to be able to continue to do so in a relatively repression-free 
environment they have to come to terms with two factors. First, the recourse 
to armed violence to impose their vision of society has to be out of the 
question because this would simply invite a conflict with the authorities 
and the other sectors of society that would ultimately undermine their abil-
ity to further penetrate society. This realist attitude with respect to the sur-
rounding environment has led a prominent Salafist figure such as Abu 
Ayadh to repeat over and over that ‘Tunisia is dawa-land’ and not an arena 
of open conflict between belief and unbelief that would justify resorting to 
violence. This message is shared in internal debates among the different 
strands of salafism, including the sheikhs who publicly endorse Tunisia as 
dawa-land. This does not mean that there have not been and there are no 
violent incidents involving Salafists. These have occurred on numerous 
occasions. However such violence is not widespread nor systematic pre-
cisely because the leadership and many young sheikhs are not keen on it for 
both ideological and strategic reasons. Second, there is the recognition that 
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some form of coordination or structure is needed to negotiate spaces of 
activism with the state as outlined earlier.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the rise of Salafism is progres-
sively and paradoxically empowering those sectors of society militantly 
opposed to it. While under Ben Ali there was a sort of delegation of the 
battle against radical Islamism to the security services on the part of liber-
als and seculars, in the new Tunisia, where this is no longer possible, this 
sector of society has to find the strength and mobilizational capacity within 
itself to stand the challenge of what they refer to as obscurantisme.25 The 
appearance of such strong conflicts over radically diverging views of 
society in public can be in some ways cathartic for the country as whole 
because it is forced to be confronted with political projects that while anti-
thetical still find a degree of common ground in the nominal subscription 
to the recognition of the pluralism present in Tunisian society. In this con-
text it is up to the political system and the elected representatives to build 
institutions that are capable and sufficiently strong to manage such social 
conflict and find the balance for the creation of a ‘pact of co-existence.’ The 
success of the Tunisian transition and therefore the role that Salafism will 
ultimately play depends on the strength of this pact and events such as 
the assassination of Belaid seem to unfortunately point in the opposite 
direction.
Conclusion
This article does not question the importance of examining the institu-
tional and political games that take place at state level with their emphasis 
on the workings of the Constitutional assembly, the political parties and 
the reform process of the institutions of the state. However it is also impor-
tant to analyze what occurs ‘below the radar’ in wider society without fall-
ing into the dual traps of surprise and alarmism. The Salafist phenomenon 
in Tunisia is a relevant aspect of the changes that have taken place in the 
country over the longue durée and a closer look at its complexity is neces-
sary to highlight both the constraints and opportunities that weigh on the 
whole process of transition.
25) Nadia Marzouki, “Four keys to understand Tunisian politics after the elections,” Focus 
article, Observatory of Euro-Mediterranean Policies 11 (2011): 1-4.
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Salafism in Tunisia is in a state of flux, rife with internal contradictions 
and characterized by intense debates over the direction it should take in 
the future, but it also provides an opportunity for Tunisian society to engage 
in a rhetorical confrontation with a movement that both rejects and bene-
fits from the plural political and social system it operates in.
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